tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-72457501426086452482024-03-13T14:35:54.367-05:00Oklahoma Civil ProcedureJim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comBlogger51125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-41986918032653664612020-08-01T10:42:00.001-05:002020-08-01T10:42:02.255-05:00Courts lack jurisdiction on merits if action is deemed dismissed under 12 OS 2004(I)If an action is deemed dismissed without prejudice under 12 OS 2004(I) because (i) failure to serve within 180 days and (ii) failure to show good cause, then the District Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the matter, such as whether it should be dismissed with prejudice based on a statute of limitations defense.<div><br></div><div><a href="https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=487191">https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=487191</a><br></div>Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-10594498695097928382019-10-25T09:15:00.001-05:002019-10-25T09:15:40.452-05:00Supreme Court Rule revisedOklahoma Supreme Court Rule 1.27(a) is amended, removing a trap for the unwary regarding the deadline for cross- or counter-appeals.<div><br></div><div>http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=486268<br></div>Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-9268099129442812832019-10-22T20:41:00.001-05:002019-10-22T20:41:14.363-05:00Lodestar findings<div>"If a trial court enhances or reduces the lodestar when assessing attorney fees, the court should include its specific reasons in the judgment."<br></div><div><br></div><div>http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=486277<br></div><div><br></div>https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=2611516455551866&id=422566324446901&sfnsn=moJim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-24629685820661792122018-07-26T09:54:00.001-05:002018-07-26T09:54:18.238-05:00New decision on attorney lien enforcement<p dir="ltr">In a new decision addressing attorney charging liens, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that a counterclaim for malpractice against the attorney seeking to enforce the lien was not a compulsory counterclaim in the proceeding to enforce the lien, and therefore was properly dismissed. </p>
<p dir="ltr">Also, because the enforcement of the lien was equitable in nature, it was within the jurisdiction of the assigned Special Judge notwithstanding the limitations on the jurisdiction of special judges.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=483220">http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=483220</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-1022597821054927972018-07-06T15:45:00.001-05:002018-07-06T15:45:00.798-05:00Judgment reversed where counsel was late for trial<p dir="ltr">The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed a small claims court judgment where defendant's counsel was late for court due to a clerical error on counsel's calendar, even though counsel had not yet entered an appearance, but where counsel had contacted the court, and his client advised the court that her attorney was late.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=483066">http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=483066</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-31042061527938682372018-06-30T13:43:00.001-05:002018-06-30T13:43:20.673-05:00New fee shifting decision<p dir="ltr">Debtor who paid off debt after collection lawsuit was filed but before a judgment was entered avoided an attorney fee award under 12 OS 936. (But, watch for contractual fee-shifting provisions.)</p>
<p dir="ltr">"This Court has said before that 'without some judgment or judicial decree that has changed the relationship between the parties so that defendant is judicially required to do something, i.e., some enforceable judgment, plaintiffs cannot be said to be the successful or prevailing parties entitled to an award of attorney fees.' Moreover, we have said that, on a claim in which damages are a necessary element, a plaintiff <u>cannot</u> be said to have prevailed on that claim unless he or she has been awarded some modicum of monetary relief."</p>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=483011">http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=483011</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-83898755190811347622018-02-09T12:08:00.001-06:002018-02-09T12:08:27.835-06:00Legislative update, 2018 Oklahoma sessionHere are quick updates on Title 12 bills before the Oklahoma legislature:<br />
<ol>
<li>SB1550 would appear to create a new procedure for attacking a judgment based on evidence not previously presented or heard by the court. The new statute would be added to the Oklahoma Evidence Code. It contains no limitations period. It makes no requirement that the evidence be "new" in the manner currently contemplated. This bill runs the risk of disrupting the finality of judgments in Oklahoma. On the other hand, a court interpreting this statute, if enacted, by treat it as purely procedural and require that it be interpreted consistently with existing statutes and common law regarding "new evidence" and applicable statutes of limitations. Sen. Anthony Sykes is the author. The bill is assigned to the Senate Judiciary Committee.</li>
<li>SB968 would amend 12 O.S. 2008 by moving us toward more specific pleading requirements. Among other things, the bill would strike Section 2008(E)(1), which requires that pleadings be simple, concise, and direct. More importantly, Section 2008(A)(1) would be amended to require particularized pleading of all material facts creating a reasonable inference that the claimant is entitled to relief. If a party pleads a fact based upon belief, the party would be required to particularly plead all facts upon which the belief is based. Sen. Julie Daniels is the author. The bill is assigned to the Senate Judiciary Committee.</li>
<li>HB3482 would amend 12 O.S. 696.4, which provides procedure for recovery of attorney fees and costs, by adding a substantive right for the State of Oklahoma to recover attorney fees and costs in any action in which it is the prevailing party. The bill's author is Rep. John Jordan. The bill is referred to the House Rules Committee.</li>
<li>HB2766 would amend 12 O.S. 759, 762, and 769 would allow the appraiser upon execution of a judgment to be a disinterested legal entity rather than three individuals. The bill would also allow bids at Sheriff sales to take place electronically. Rep. Scott McEachin is the author. The bill is assigned to the House Judiciary Committee.</li>
<li>HB2863 would amend 12 O.S. 667, dealing with legislative continuances. This bill would allow the legislator who is either a party or counsel of record to request the continuance by telephone, electronically, or by facsimile no later than one day before the event to be continued. Additional requirements are imposed, such as filing a motion two weeks later, and requiring the continued hearing to occur at least ten days after the legislative session ends. Rep. Jason Lowe is the author. The bill is assigned to the House Judiciary Committee.</li>
<li>HB2871 would create a new procedure for real property owned by one but not both spouses, and which property is not the other spouse's homestead. The owner spouse can initiate an action requesting the court to judicially determine that the property is not, or was not, the other spouse's homestead. This would be intended to allow cures to title defects based on the other spouse's failure or refusal to join a deed on property that that spouse holds no homestead interest. The cure would be available for up to ten years after the conveyance. Rep. Scott McEachin is the author. The bill is assigned to the House Judiciary Committee.</li>
<li>HB3281 would amend 12 O.S. 1148.5A, dealing with forcible entry and detainer (FED). The amendment would allow the landlord to later seek damages for rent and other monetary relief if the court in the FED action renders solely judgment for possession. Rep. Chris Kannady is the author. The bill is assigned to the House Judiciary Committee.</li>
<li>SB1299 would amend 12 O.S. 3234 to impose the same requirement added in one of the two competing versions adopted last session, dealing with the timing of requests for production or entry upon land (RFP). More specifically, the RFP could be served only (i) after an answer is filed or (ii) upon leave of court if no answer is filed. Title was stricken in the Senate Judiciary Committee, meaning that the bill would be re-heard by the Senate if approved by the Senate and then approved by the House. This indicates that amendments are anticipated at some point in the process. We might see more amendments designed to either conform the two competing versions passed last year or impose additional amendments to the statute. Rep. John Sparks is the author. As noted above, title was stricken by the Senate Judiciary Committee, but otherwise the bill received a do-pass from that committee.</li>
<li>SB1503 would amend 12 O.S. 2015 to give the party responding to an amended pleading twenty days to respond, rather than the ten days provided in the statute. Rep. John Sparks is the author. The bill is assigned to the Senate Judiciary Committee.</li>
</ol>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-49530275989695035552017-09-29T10:25:00.001-05:002017-09-29T10:25:46.965-05:00Equitable division of contingent fee upheld; Burk factors did not apply<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=481569">http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=481569</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-64593727739849589502017-09-29T10:20:00.001-05:002017-09-29T10:20:26.131-05:00Summary judgment reversed in collections case where pro se answer and MSJ response fairly raised fact issues regarding the balance owed<p dir="ltr">Pro se defendant alleged sufficient facts in his answer to invoke accord and satisfaction and possible violation of consumer protection statutes. Creditor did not sufficiently prove up the balance owed, thus leaving a fact issue.</p>
<p dir="ltr">http<a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=481610">://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=481610</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-74842690503435356252017-06-18T15:30:00.001-05:002017-06-18T15:30:29.635-05:00Oklahoma Supreme Court addresses application of 20 OS 95.10<p dir="ltr">The Oklahoma Supreme Court holds that 20 OS 95.10 does not require judicial disqualification upon appellate reversal and remand.  The statute is not allowed to usurp the courts' superintending control of judicial assignments.</p>
<p dir="ltr">"<i>Mere reversal of a lower court's dispositive rulings will not, standing alone, provide a sufficient basis to warrant disqualification</i>."</p>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://www.oklahomatrustlaw.com/2017/02/new-decision-on-20-os-9510.html">http://www.oklahomatrustlaw.com/2017/02/new-decision-on-20-os-9510.html</a></p>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479768">http://www.oscn.net/applications/</a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479768">oscn</a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479768">/DeliverDocument.asp?</a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479768">CiteID</a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479768">=479768</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-17674298716267631452017-06-18T15:26:00.001-05:002017-06-18T15:26:17.387-05:00Commentary on the BNSF decision<p dir="ltr">Follow the link for excellent commentary on the BNSF decision on general jurisdiction.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://journalrecord.com/2017/06/14/gavel-to-gavel-limiting-general-jurisdiction/">http://journalrecord.com/2017/06/14/gavel-to-gavel-limiting-general-jurisdiction/</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-10229023645877485162017-06-14T21:33:00.001-05:002017-06-14T21:33:45.312-05:00BNSF decision, limiting general jurisdiction<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://journalrecord.com/2017/06/14/gavel-to-gavel-limiting-general-jurisdiction/">http://journalrecord.com/2017/06/14/gavel-to-gavel-limiting-general-jurisdiction/</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-84402835845658513902017-01-21T14:13:00.002-06:002017-01-21T14:13:40.398-06:00NEW COURT DECISION REAFFIRMS ABSENCE OF PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR PERJURY<span style="background-color: white; color: #3d3d3d; font-family: "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">If a garnishment affidavit contains a false statement, this does not give rise to a separate cause of action. Instead, the remedy is within the action where the false statement was made. "[S]uch an allegation is a defense to the underlying collection action and must be asserted in that suit." </span><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479757" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #c2272d; font-family: "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">Stricklen v. O.I.P.M., LLC, 2017 OK CIV APP 3</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #3d3d3d; font-family: "Helvetica Neue", Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">.</span>Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-53245414826580600792016-11-25T16:10:00.001-06:002016-11-25T16:10:30.799-06:00Opening statements<p dir="ltr">An excellent read on opening statements, from a legendary Oklahoma trial lawyer, of use to anyone with an interest in Oklahoma trial procedure.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://www.okbar.org/members/BarJournal/archive2016/NovemberArchive2016/OBJ8730West.aspx">http://www.okbar.org/members/BarJournal/archive2016/NovemberArchive2016/OBJ8730West.aspx</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-63892303244094268682016-11-25T08:07:00.000-06:002016-11-25T08:13:04.182-06:00Block QuotesWe've all seen them -- block quotes from other sources. This writing technique has become a simple and way-too-easy method of adding sources and content -- to everything from a blog post to an appellate brief. Content editors provide tools for indentation of your block quote, which can then be linked back to the original source. I would say that this crutch has become overused, but the word 'become' would be out-of-place. Twenty-two years ago, when reading and judging "write-on essays" for <i>Texas Law Review</i>, I found that at least a handful of my contemporaries would scarcely connect their series of block quotes with text, barely sufficient to connect their reasoning in some logical manner. These law students were among the best -- law students, after all, at the University of Texas. But their method of presentation became both a distraction and a reminder that their reasoning was borrowed.<br />
<br />
The hallowed halls of UT Law placed great emphasis on original thought. I spent a great deal of my third year editing articles by and about Prof. Philip Bobbitt, whose writings represent some of the most enduring in generations of law professors. But some of his critics argued that Prof. Bobbitt's thoughts were not original. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford V. Levinson, <i>Constitutional Grammar</i>, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1771 (1994) was the academic equivalent of insulting a person's heritage on the playground. <i>See</i> Philip C. Bobbitt, <i>Reflections Inspired by My Critics</i>, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1869 (1994).<br />
With this emphasis on original thought, it became even more important to avoid the common practice of linking together a series of block quotes from other sources.<br />
<br />
But what are the options for the legal writer -- who is so dependent upon sources and attribution, and whose original thoughts may well be critique of or commentary on other thoughts?<br />
<br />
More after the break....<br />
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<a name='more'></a>The best approach I found during my time at UT Law was that employed by Profs. Charles Alan Wright and Arthur Miller, and their co-authors, in their multi-volume treatise, <i>Federal Practice and Procedure</i>. Prof. Wright was known to employ lengthy quotes from rules or court decisions within the text of his paragraphs, without the use of block quotes. These in-line quotes defied the rules of form, which would require lengthy quotes to appear as block quotes. But Prof. Wright was deemed to hold the authority to establish his own rules of form for his writings. (His citation form, while likely based on standards adopted in some manner at some point, typically varied significantly from the Blue Book and other standard forms.)<br />
<br />
Prof. Wright's approach was more than a stylistic solution to the clumsy appearance of strung-together block quotes. When Prof. Wright found solid reasoning in court decisions, he showed appreciation for it by weaving it into his commentary on federal procedure. He was selective and efficient in choosing his quotes from great judicial writers. Prof. Wright's in-line quotations were neither clumsy nor cumbersome.<br />
<br />
When stacking together block quotes in an essay, brief, or blog post, the writer seeking convenience will leave in impertinent text and detail. In fact, many block quotes contain so much immaterial information and even poor writing that some readers skip block quotes altogether. Try reading a popular piece containing block quotes. Can you follow the article if you skip the block quotes?<br />
<br />
Among many other things, Prof. Terri LeClercq taught us (students in her writing and editing course) that a reader should be able to follow your writing by reading nothing more than the first sentence of each paragraph. This was the pyramid structure of writing -- lead each paragraph with your main idea, then support the main idea with each subsequent sentence.<br />
<br />
Perhaps this explains why block quotes don't work -- they can be skipped, but if the reader thereby misses the big idea of your writing, then what good have they done?Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-2613657245858125942016-11-25T06:38:00.000-06:002016-11-25T06:38:00.781-06:00IN CASE YOU MISSED IT: Civility in motion practice<a href="http://www.oklahomacivilprocedure.com/2013/01/civility-in-motion-practice.html?spref=bl">Oklahoma Civil Procedure: Civility in motion practice</a>: I recently had occasion to review a seminar presentation that I gave ten years ago. The topic was ethics in appellate and summary judgment ...Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-55180228459940100312016-10-12T20:04:00.001-05:002016-10-12T20:04:15.616-05:00Appealable denial<p dir="ltr">Oklahoma Supreme Court carves another small exception to the rule that denials of summary judgment cannot be reviewed on appeal.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479373">http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479373</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-63752934675440302662016-09-20T17:47:00.000-05:002016-09-20T17:47:01.635-05:00New decision interpreting Section 2403 regarding prejudicial evidencePlease note the following new decision, ordering a new trial based on 12 OS
2403 for prejudicial evidence of a prior conviction in a vehicle negligence
case. <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479202">http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479202</a>Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-68695357857631620272016-09-20T17:45:00.002-05:002016-09-20T17:45:06.657-05:00Section 3009.1 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code upheld in face of constitutional challenge<div class="MsoNormal">
Notable decision. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
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<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479345">http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=479345</a></div>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-67973137312350567312016-03-03T09:31:00.000-06:002016-03-03T09:31:29.852-06:00Gavel to Gavel: Passionate Independence<div>
In a book whose title I have long since forgotten, professor Sanford Levinson compared the U.S. Constitution to Ulysses’ pact with the crew of his ship, to bind him to the ship’s mast as it transported him past the Sirens. My quick research shows that many other constitutional scholars have written about the allegory, including Stephen Holmes and Jon Elster, who wrote from the perspectives of philosophy and social sciences.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
But the allegory helps understand why we, as a nation and as the state of Oklahoma, would impose limitations on the current majority’s ability to fundamentally change our government. Founders (state or federal) hold a responsibility to protect us from future majorities – regardless of political affiliation. Our federal constitution is designed to protect the country from expansive new legislation that might be enacted by an administration seeking fundamental change. Likewise, our state constitution and legal system is designed to help us avoid governmental change.</div>
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Read more: http://journalrecord.com/2016/03/02/gavel-to-gavel-passionate-independence-opinion/#ixzz41r1cWA31</div>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-56082284046190944772015-07-28T08:09:00.001-05:002015-07-28T08:15:08.884-05:00The Court's decision on the Ten Commandments<p dir="ltr">The Court's decision on the Ten Commandments is now available for download on the Court's docket.  The main decision was entered on July 27, 2015, along with five separate opinions <u>joined</u> by various combinations of the nine justices.  These five separate opinions give Oklahomans great insight into the <u>justices'</u> views of the law on Oklahoma's establishment clause.  Required reading for any Oklahoma interested in our State's Constitution and constitutional law.  Find the decision and separate opinions in PDF form, linked here:   <br>
<a href="http://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&cmid=115447">http://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&cmid=115447</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-62308422943193641672015-07-07T21:00:00.001-05:002015-07-07T21:00:06.609-05:00Our constitutional dispute<p dir="ltr">Our "constitutional dispute" is making national news. Here are a few things to keep in mind. First, no one is in violation of court orders yet. The matter remains on appeal until mandate is issued, which will be after the rehearing process (whether granted or denied). Once mandate is issued, the mandate must be "spread of record." And the Supreme Court's order suggests further proceedings on remand, presumably consisting of some motions dealing with how the Supreme Court's decision will be memorialized in the trial court. That does take time. But we can expect the plaintiffs to seek swift movement. Second, the Governor's statement does not state that she will order a violation of the Court order. It just says (i) we respect rule of law, (ii) we will seek further proceedings, (iii) we will seek a constitutional amendment, and (iv) the memorial isn't going anywhere. This leaves her leeway to order compliance with the court order once it is enforceable. Third, I don't think it will be the governor who will be in contempt as she is not a party. The party defendant is the Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority. The Authority is represented by the OKAG. It is not clear yet whether the OKAG will sponsor or allow contempt of court. I will be watching this one closely, as it has the potential to turn into a constitutional crisis. But it isn't there yet.<br></p>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/07/07/oklahomas-ten-commandments-statue-isnt-going-anywhere-governor-says/">http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/07/07/oklahomas-ten-commandments-statue-isnt-going-anywhere-governor-says/</a></p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-81048838411373504682015-05-13T10:57:00.000-05:002015-05-14T12:43:36.913-05:00New law on discovery masters becomes effective 11/1/2015<div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; color: #4d4f51; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 24px; margin-bottom: 30px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
On May 12, 2015, Gov. Fallin approved SB1920, which contains a new law providing for discovery masters, or special masters, in Oklahoma state court proceedings. The new law will appear at 12 O.S. 3225.1.</div>
<div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; color: #4d4f51; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: inherit; line-height: 24px; margin-bottom: 30px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">
As Chair of the Oklahoma Bar Association’s Civil Procedure & Evidence Code Committee, I have worked with a number of Oklahoma lawyers and judges in crafting the language of this proposed statute. The proposal was approved by the OBA House of Delegates at its annual meeting in 2013. Subsequently, the proposal was advanced by a group of Tulsa attorneys who believe that the enactment of a discovery-master statute is a positive step for the State and its judicial system.</div>
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The language is based in large part on Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for federal courts to appoint “judicial masters” to address complex issues in exceptional cases. Judicial masters are typically private attorneys, CPAs, or other professionals who are appointed by courts to address complex issues in specific cases. </div>
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The goal of “judicial masters,” such as discovery masters, is to ensure efficiency in the court system. As stated in the comments to the 2003 amendment to Rule 53, “[t]he appointment of masters to participate in pretrial proceedings has developed extensively over the last two decades as some district courts have felt the need for additional help in managing complex litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 53, 2003 <em style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">advisory note</em>. The use of masters in complex matters will help allow judges to address other matters on their dockets. As one commentator noted, “[t]he presence of complex cases directly affects a court’s average case resolution time.” Lynn Jokela & David F. Herr, <em style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Special Masters in State Court Complex Litigation: An Available and Underused Case Management Tool</em>, 31 William Mitchell L. Rev. 1299, 1320 (2005). “The objective of some state courts is to alleviate some of the caseload problems. The sheer magnitude of a complex case may overwhelm the time available to a judge who has other cases on the docket. Conducting in camera review of documents to review claims of privilege might take weeks or months of time, and many judges cannot fairly absent themselves from their other cases to devote this amount of time to a single case. Other courts appoint special masters to preside over discovery motions involving highly specialized issues.” <em style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Id</em>. at 1302. </div>
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Prior to the enactment of Section 3225.1, Oklahoma statutes provided for referees, but only in cases of accountings or with the consent of the parties. Some state court judges have used the Oklahoma referee statutes for the appointment of discovery masters, but in these cases the judge would need the parties to consent. In some cases, a litigant who is engaged in aggressive discovery tactics or otherwise causing delay or expense to the litigation process may refuse to consent to the appointment of a discovery master. In other instances, one or more litigants may believe that they benefit from delays in litigation, and withhold their consent on this basis. The new statute will remove the ability of litigants to withhold their consent from the appointment of a discovery master, and at the same time will impose restrictions and requirements on the use of discovery masters. </div>
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Section 3225.1 implements a number of protections designed to prevent overuse or abuse of the discovery master tool. More specifically, before a discovery master can be appointed in the face of objection (or lack of consent) from the litigants, the judge must make special findings that the case is complex or otherwise exceptional and that the benefit of appointment of a discovery master will outweigh the cost. Section 3225.1 expressly states that discovery masters should not be routinely appointed. The statute also allows the judge to allocate the cost of the discovery master based, among other things, on the litigants’ means to pay the costs and their responsibility for the discovery dispute requiring appointment of the discovery master. By using private professionals to serve as discovery masters, Section 3225.1 shifts some of the cost of complex discovery disputes away from the State, with those costs to be borne by the litigants or a common fund.</div>
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In sum, the enactment of this new law should provide added efficiency to state-court litigation.</div>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-76698067672697632292015-01-30T19:05:00.001-06:002015-01-30T19:05:49.436-06:00Procedure for attorney disqualification must be followed<p dir="ltr">In <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=474997"><i>Mitts v. Stamps</i></a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=474997">, 2015 OK CIV APP 7</a>, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the trial court must follow the prescribed procedure in disqualifying a party's legal counsel.  The <i>Mitts</i><i> </i>court held:</p>
<p dir="ltr">¶7 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has conferred a special procedural status on motions to disqualify counsel. As the Court most recently re-affirmed in <i>Miami Bus. </i><i>Servs</i><i>., LLC v. Davis</i>, <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=468709">2013 OK 20</a>, <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=468709">299 </a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=468709">P.3d</a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=468709"> 477</a>, a trial court considering such a motion must follow the procedure set forth in <i>Piette</i><i> v. Bradley & </i><i>Leseberg</i>, <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=4548">1996 OK 124</a>, ¶ 2, <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=4548">930 </a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=4548">P.2d</a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=4548"> 183</a>, and<i>Arkansas</i><i> Valley State Bank v. Phillips</i>, <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=451011">2007 OK 78</a>, <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=451011">171 </a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=451011">P.3d</a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=451011"> 899</a>, before ruling whether an attorney should be disqualified based on conflict of interest or improper possession of confidential information. <i>Miami Bus</i>,<i> </i>¶ 24. The trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing, and then make a specific factual finding in its order that the attorney either had, or did not have, knowledge of material and confidential information. <i>Id. </i>Without such findings, we cannot review the correctness of the courts' disqualification decision, or any exercise of discretion in refusing to vacate the disqualification.</p>
<p dir="ltr">¶8 The district court relied on District Court Rule 4e (motion may be deemed confessed if not responded to) and Rule 4h (motions may be decided by the court without a hearing). We find no current case law holding that <i>Miami Bus </i>and<i>Piette</i> place motions to disqualify counsel outside of the provisions of Rule 4e and Rule 4h. Nevertheless, those decisions are clear that the right to choose counsel is fundamental, and counsel cannot be disqualified without the required hearing and findings, even when a disqualification motion goes unanswered. We therefore remand this matter for a hearing consistent with the <i>Miami Bus </i>decision.</p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7245750142608645248.post-5399186189598800122015-01-30T18:33:00.001-06:002015-01-30T18:33:57.327-06:00Summary judgment affirmed after plaintiff's affidavit is stricken<p dir="ltr">In<i> </i><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=474998"><i>Kutz</i></a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=474998"><i> v. Deere & Co.</i></a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=474998">, 2015 OK CIV APP 6</a>, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed a summary judgment in favor of a defendant after the court struck the plaintiff's self-serving affidavit.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Deere & Co. court held:</p>
<p dir="ltr">¶9 "When determining whether an affidavit may be disregarded because it attempts to create a sham issue of fact, the Court may consider whether the party was cross-examined during earlier testimony, whether the party had access to the evidence at the time of earlier testimony or whether the affidavit was based on newly discovered evidence, and whether the earlier testimony reflects confusion which the affidavit attempts to explain." <i>Tortorelli</i><i> v. Mercy Health Center, Inc</i>., <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=461347">2010 OK CIV APP 105</a>, ¶ 30, <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=461347">242 </a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=461347">P.3d</a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=461347"> 549</a>, 561 (citing <i>Ishmael v. Andrew</i>, <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=447235">2006 OK CIV APP 82</a>, ¶16, <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=447235">137 </a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=447235">P.3d</a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=447235"> 1271</a>, 1276). "A trial court may disregard an affidavit purporting to create an issue of fact by directly contradicting prior deposition testimony during which the deponent was both cross-examined and had access to the information forming the basis for the affidavit at the time of the deposition." <i>Tortorelli</i>, <i>id</i>., (citing <i>Savage v. Burton</i>, <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=445275">2005 OK CIV APP 106</a>, <a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=445275">125 </a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=445275">P.3d</a><a href="http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=445275"> 1249</a>).</p>
<p dir="ltr">¶10 In this case, Kutz was deposed at great length in July 2012 with his attorney present about evidence to which he clearly had prior access, including<i> his</i> letter to Deere proposing a settlement of their dispute. At the deposition, Kutz admitted not being forced to write his proposal letter, he understood "reaching a settlement" meant the parties would compromise and end their dispute, and that he knew he was releasing his personal claims for money arising from the fire and the equipment. He also admitted he was neither told nor threatened that if he did not settle and/or release his claims with Deere that it would not let him rent the haying equipment from Grissoms.</p>
Jim Miltonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11015812613133361447noreply@blogger.com